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Abstract— This work takes as its theme public policies on 
development. It aims an overall analysis of the most 
urgent issues of political and economic plans launched in 
Brazil in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Specifically, the intention is to discuss the establishment 
of government policies in combating bottlenecks in the 
national economy through the Plans. This is an article 
based on concepts of development and the major general 
lines of the development plans in this country. Kon’s 
works (1999) are the fundamental theoretical basis. We 
notice that Brazil experienced two very different decades, 
the 1970s and 1980s: the first focused investment for 
economic growth; the second, turned to fighting inflation. 
Because of discourses and appointed limits, 
developmentalism occurred, but no development in the 
strict sense. Between public debt and inflation addiction, 
which were parallel in the two mentioned decades, (still) 
rests the same issue in the country: What is development? 
What is the country’s development? 
Keywords— Development. Bottlenecks. State. Planning. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Big issues related to government plans always exist; there 
are always some threads that express ideologies, while 
inducing the perception of an urgent need for investment 
to tackle problems from different orders. The big issues, 
however, are sometimes activated by external policy 
models and discourses. This is a problem of world order. 
The relentless pursuit of development is not an invention 
of Brazil. According to Sachs (2000), the “development” 
came to existence in the most important era of the United 
States and through that country, after the Second World 
War, more specifically on January 20th, 1949, when it 
launched the political campaign in a global level which 
turned it into a role model for the world. That happened 
on President Harry Truman’s inauguration day, with the 
following statement: “We must embark on a bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (p. 
59). The apparent American solidarity is the marketing 
that induces the selling of a capitalist model, which is 
based on the immediacy of budget credits and sinks in 
long-term debt. In the long term, there is also a 
naturalization of coexistence of developed and 
underdeveloped countries, with ties of dependence and 
increasing distancing of economic moats. 
 We immediately raise the issue of import 
development to shed light on the conditions of the 
country in its economic planning. In the history of the 
creation of Development Plans, the major bottlenecks in 
economy appear in different ways in public policies, 
drawing us to the following question: what are these 
bottlenecks and how are they addressed when predicting 
investment and government intervention guidelines in 
Brazil? 
 The diagnosis on planning is always essential for 
the recognition of the positive and negative aspects that 
practice teaches. But there is another evaluation, a 
previous one, of proposals review, in order to understand 
the conditions of its emergence, the context of its 
application and the expectations generated by any new 
proposal. The Planos Nacionais de Desenvolvimento – 
PNDs (National Development Plans) are a rich source of 
public policies, controversy, ideology and even utopian 
aims abundant, and they require critical unveiling to 
better substantiate the history of economic development 
in the country. This study might seem a little late for each 
Plan, but it is not so for the historical context and the 
expectations of new plans, drawn up with every change of 
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government, crisis or simply need or interest in 
incrementalism, interventions and changes of all kinds. 
From the PNDs I, for instance, to the price-freeze 
orthodox plans, the examples are many, and they are 
complex and often controversial. One of the expectations 
is that there is an unresolved developmentalism on the 
national scenario. 
 This is a bibliographic study that aims to analyze 
the most urgent issues regarding political and economic 
plans launched in Brazil in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Specifically, the intention is to discuss 
the establishment of government policies on tackling 
bottlenecks in the national economy through the Plans 
during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
II. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
Before starting the analysis of Metas Plan, we make a 
digression about the conditions of development in the 
world. Berman’s work (1986) is appropriate. In two of his 
chapters he examines development’s fundamentalism and 
unravels the myth of appearances in this process. In 
“Goethe’s Faust: The Tragedy of Development”, he 
exposes the conceptual foundations of global 
developmentalism through the ideological profile of the 
character Faust. Ownership is highlighted as one of the 
principles of power; and each person’s effort, as 
individual capital in the wake of development (p. 48-9). 
The latter requires policy and control. In the capitalist 
axis, its premised is the exploitation of workers. What 
matters are outcomes and not people or processes. This 
form of development is condemnable according to the 
essence of Faust: “It is as if the development process, 
even when it turns the empty land into a stunning physical 
and social space, recreated the empty land in the heart of 
the same fomenter. That is how the tragedy of 
development works” (p. 66). 
 In the chapter “Petersburg: the modernism of 
underdevelopment”, Berman (1986) talks about a look-
like capitalism. The project designed by the dictator Pedro 
I, for the foundation of St. Petersburg, viewed the Russian 
city as a “political theater” and “everyday life as a 
spectacle”, for the death of more than 150 thousand 
workers was the means to make sculptural works so that 
they could be used by an elite that was in opposition to a 
crowd of strangers. It was a way of seeking hegemony at 
the expense of wonder. Berman (1986) saw it as a 
“bizarre modernity” (p. 174) that should prompt people to 
feed such form of expression. By reference to the Bronze 
Horseman from Alexander Pushkin's poem (1833), he 
shows the motivation to keep the movement desire in the 
heart of society, ranging from the congeniality of the 
aristocrats and the threshold of the uprising of the people. 
A form of surrealism then was maintained, which raised 
as fascination work what was cemented in the ground of 
the low classes. 
 The National Development Plans, in Brazil, 
often reveal some tendency to reach prestige, up to the 
point of resignation, when the seek to overcome chronic 
problems, such as poverty and misery (in part byproducts 
of inflation) appears desperately. Through a utopia of 
magnitude they try to reach the long crossing that 
separates the predatory development of sustainable 
development. For the scope of this study, that crossing 
would still be at a great distance. 
 The goal here is not to describe the plans, but to 
reveal what they highlight as appeal or trend during their 
period of existence. First, we must distinguish 
development from developmentalism. Sachs (2000) 
brings concepts in chronological order, conditioned to 
ideologies and social states historically settled in often 
biased chains. He differentiates an American 
developmentalism of self-indulgent marketing from 
another concept that unfolds progressively until the 
modern and necessary assumption that implies 
sustainability and equity. He proceeds from an 
evolutionary theory to reach the sociology of sense. That 
is, he starts from the precarious sense that development is 
a continuous transformation that reaches the problematic 
of the term in the minefield of politics, economy, science, 
technology and other topics of social life within the 
paradigm of complexity. 
 Development, beyond the sense of 
transformation, of movement, is a historical process that 
depends on the context in which it is employed. Thus, 
there is industrial development, social, economic, regional 
development. But the term is also capable of, while only a 
noun unit, represent the whole complexity of issues that it 
entails. Sachs (2000) demonstrates a conditioned and 
addicted concept first, and then gets to the expectation of 
what the term may represent universally: when he relates 
it to the ideal of world leadership of the United States 
after World War II, he criticizes colonialism, which 
separates developed from underdeveloped ones; when he 
analyses the United Nations’ (UN) concept in 1960’s, he 
subjects the term to social issues, particularly regarding 
the improvement of quality of life. He cites UN 
conclusions in the Report of the 1969 Meeting of Experts 
on Social Policy and Planning, from 1971, to show the 
other side of the same process: “The fact that 
development leaves in its way, or somehow even creates, 
large areas of poverty, stagnation, marginality and a real 
exclusion of social and economic progress is too obvious 
and too urgent to be ignored” (p. 68). The assertion is 
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confirmed in view of the regional inequalities and of the 
large pockets of poverty in countries like Brazil. 
 The first assumption to be considered, with the 
progress of the concept, is that development is not 
summed up to economic growth. According to 
Schumpeter (1997, p. 70), “[...] the economic status of a 
people does not emerge out of simply previous economic 
conditions, but uniquely out of a previous whole 
situation.” It is understood that the economic situation is 
one of the social issues and they are seen as intertwined 
permanently. To alienate one from the other stops the 
correct apprehension of this debated concept here; it 
alienates a Nation’s proposals. The concept has changed, 
according to Amaro, cited by Moreira and Crespo (2012, 
p. 39), because of the following circumstances: 
(i) the frustrations of the Third World 
countries due to the evolution of their 
development; (ii) increasing signs of social 
malaise in developed countries; (iii) the 
awareness of environmental problems 
caused by development; (iv) irregularities 
of economic growth in the decades 
following the “golden years”; (v) the 
multiplication of various crises in socialist 
countries. 
 The historical context compels to revisionism. 
For a perspective of “developmentalism”, which is the 
controversial practice of the concept or concepts of 
development, we simply have to look at the reverse side 
of the Development practiced mainly since last century. 
Sachs (2000) highlights the production of waste from 
polluting factories and poison pesticide; the shortages 
resulting from unsustainable exploitation; the violent 
capitalist domination, which devalues forms of social life 
in favor of invasive economic power of market, in order 
to demonstrate a certain perversion of the term. He 
contrasts valuation and devaluation: 
The fragile individual, whose survival 
depends necessarily on the market, was not 
an invention of economists, nor was born to 
Adam and Eve, as these argue. It was a 
historic setting. It was created by the 
economic project that redesigned humanity. 
The metamorphosis of autonomous men 
and women into a devalued “economic 
man” was, in fact, a precondition for the 
emergence of the economic society, and is a 
condition that must be constantly renewed, 
reconfirmed and deepened so that the reign 
of the economy can continue. The 
devaluation is the secret of economic value 
and can only be created with violence and a 
permanent confrontation with whoever 
opposes it (p. 74). 
 Devaluation extends to culture, groups’ ways of 
life, autonomy, social equity, once they oppose economic 
growth proposals. Developmentalism is a negative result 
of development proposals based solely on capital 
expansion, even when indirect, through targeted 
investments, putting aside urgent bottlenecks such as 
health, education, housing, safety and environment, 
causing them to be in a more severe situation, besides 
science, technology, culture and other issues of social 
context. Developmentalism is expressed, for example, in 
inflation risks, in environmental degradation, in low 
scientific and technological production and in other 
factors of blatant stagnation, retrogression, dependence 
and many kinds of (political, governmental) disorder. In 
the two most alarming decades of the second half of the 
twentieth century, we highlight two very different facets 
of Brazil, in the wake of developmentalism: a debt in 
favor of prospect of economic growth and uncontrolled 
and excessive vicious circle of inflation. 
 
2.1BRAZIL-POTENCY IDEOLOGIES 
 Every organization requires planning. It is a 
governance assumption and is not limited to only one 
kind. The Development Plans specialize in the 
perspective of problem solving and/or in the opportune 
use of contemporary opportunities. Their success, 
however, depends not only on their configuration, but 
also on the choices made and management conditions that 
may be established, in addition to occurrences of internal 
and external scenarios. 
 According to Gremaud and Pires (1999, 41), the 
establishment of action programs is a tradition that started 
in 1950: “[...] in the Kubitschek period, Metas Plan; 
Trienal Plan, during Goulart’s presidency; PAEG during 
Castelo Branco’s term; and PED (Strategic Development 
Plan) during Costa e Silva’s period.” The National 
Development Plans became mandatory through the 
Complementary Acts 43 and 76, in 1969, and should last 
as long as a president’s term. The document Metas e 
Bases para a Ação do Governo immediately preceded 
PND I, in 1970, under President Emilio Garrastazu 
Médici, and worked as a complement of that document. 
That was the period of the “military coup”, taken place in 
1964, and was followed by an internal coup to maintain 
the military in power, especially with public debate’s 
restrictions by the Institutional Act 5 (AI-5), from 
December 1968. 
 Before, during Juscelino Kubitschek’s 
government, with the evolution of ideologies of the 
country in a utopian proportion of “50 years in 5”, the 
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intention was, according to Mendonça (1988, p 51), to 
promote an “acceleration of capitalist accumulation” in 
the short term and, in the medium term, raise the quality 
of life. This ideology of fast growth continued in the first 
PND, highlighting that the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) should increase at over 7% per year. According to 
the document, quoted by Gremaud and Pires (1999, p. 
44), a self-challenge was set to culminate in the ideas of 
splendor that insisted in emerging: “[...] Brazil not only 
aims to grow. It desires, till the end of the century, to be 
part of the developed world.” It is necessary to analyze 
what the implications of these ideologies of splendor are, 
as  Mendonça says (1988, p 75.): 
the period between 1962 and 1977 was a 
whole economic crisis, and from the 
inflection produced in 1964, a calculated 
recession was carried out, and it was 
considered necessary for the restoration of 
the economic cycle. Its result would be ― 
between 1968 and 1974 ―known as "the 
Brazilian miracle", whose essence meant 
nothing but the assurance of Pharaonic 
profits to (domestic and foreign) 
monopolistic companies. 
 The government interventions were necessarily 
given in favor of the economic situation and can be 
specified as Gremaud and Pires (1999) expose: 
 Funding from many banks (BNB, BASA 
etc.), with longer terms;  
 Creation of tax benefits;  
 Creation of the public enterprise where there 
should be the private national enterprise 
(231 from 1968-74) / creation of sectorial 
holdings; 
 Creation of investment funds: Funds 157;  
 Expansion of the agricultural frontier and 
land use;  
 Creation of incentive funds (BEFIEX). 
 The tax benefits to industries, still according to 
Gremaud and Pires (1999, p. 49), were: 
exemption of import tax on capital goods 
with no national similar ones, IPI 
exemption on capital goods, credit in the 
IPI value for the acquisition of domestically 
produced capital goods, accelerated 
depreciation of capital goods domestically 
manufactured, preferential financial support 
by official credit institutions and priority 
granting tobe examined by the Customs 
Policy Council in case of change in import 
duties. 
 The bottleneck of economy, in this sense, would 
be the lack of development in local market, agriculture 
and industry ― especially in the latter. Brazil aimed to be 
launched into the “nuclear age”, into the “Second 
Industrial Revolution” and into the “space era”, 
surprisingly, once the country could barely keep its feet 
on the ground. Although there was what is considered the 
“economic miracle”, between 1968 and 1973, when the 
GDP, according to Gremaud and Pires (1999), increased 
at an average of 11.7% per year (12.7% in industry), some 
problems that became chronic as time passed by emerged: 
external debt, tax burden increase (from 22.4 between 
1965 and 1969 to 24.7 % between 1970 and 1973), 
dumping of society in decisions about the course of 
national economy and stagnation or fall of the minimum 
wage. Therefore, the “economic miracle” did not promote 
development in its broadest sense, agriculture increased 
only 4.9% annually between 1970 and 1973 and social 
inequality prevailed again. 
 According to Suzigan et al, cited by Gremaud 
and Pires (1999, p. 56), PND I had a triple ideology: “a) a 
national strategy for integrated development, b) a 
development strategy for the northeast, via tax incentives, 
c) implementation of a strategy of occupation and 
consolidation of the Amazon”. The plan contained 
guidelines for promoting the development of backward or 
stagnant regions, especially in frontier expansions in the 
Amazon, and industrial development in the Northeast. 
Some problems became emblematic. For example, the 
expected integration of the Amazon with the rest of the 
country by the Transamazônica Highway was lost along 
the way, for it still has not been finished. Mendonça 
(1988, p. 83) sums up an era as follows:  
The crisis of the [economic] “miracle” was 
marked by two peculiarities: that was a debt 
crisis and a crisis of breath exhaustion of 
the state in trying to maintain growth. The 
existence of foreign companies occupying a 
prominent place in the economy of the 
country created a link abroad that had a 
great impact on the creation of this crisis. 
Multinational companies imported many 
basic materials of capital goods generating 
a deficit in the commercial balance. Also, 
as they had the same amount of profits 
here, they resulted in capital flight that was 
high for the Balance of Payments. 
 The creation of a power or simply investments in 
production process are not sufficient to promote 
development. According to Furtado (1974, p. 95-6), “[...] 
the global diffusion of technical progress and the resulting 
increase in productivity do not tend to liquidate 
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‘underdevelopment’”, considering that policies of 
centralization of benefits favor small groups, and 
corruption and mismanagement cripple Plans or slaughter 
them in their course. According to Mendonça (1988), the 
working class in1974 dealt with a wage squeeze; 
problems related to the health sector increased child 
mortality and epidemics, the basic-needs grocery package 
was extremely expensive and housing increment was 
hindered by the diversion of resources from popular 
housing construction to the construction of luxury 
properties. Each of these problems requires a detailed 
investigation if the intention is to make a comprehensive 
survey of facts and deeds that have marked and guided 
the country in that period. 
 The PND II was introduced by the Government 
Ernesto Geisel in 1974, valid up to the end of the decade, 
according to Gremaud and Pires (1999 b). That was a 
time of international oil crisis and breaking of agreements 
with the Bretton Woods group, involving the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Brazil would 
continue its discourse of developmentalism for continued 
growth. The fields of activity of PND II (BRAZIL, 1974) 
were: 
a) Modernization of economy, especially in the 
Mid-South region, focusing on energy, 
transport and telecommunications;  
b) Development of domestic sources of energy 
and metallurgy; 
c) Internal colonization policy through 
Poloamazônia and program of integrated 
areas in the Northeast region, among other 
alternatives; 
d) Improvement of income distribution, with 
poverty reduction;  
e) “integration with world economy.” 
 In practice, Gremaud and Pires (1999 b) affirm 
that a positive point is that PNDII kept GDP growing; a 
negative one is that there was once again the foreign debt 
at the expense of the State, that received private debt prior 
to expiration and took them over from International 
creditors under floating rates and unstable exchange. 
Intervention measures and problems are recurrent 
between PND I and II. On one hand, the bottlenecks 
involving, in sum, regional inequality, public debt, 
inflation and insufficient industrialization; on the other 
hand, the points of germination, seen as the increment of 
international capital and exploitation of potentials for 
industry. Education, that is part of the five sectors elected 
by the Joint Commission between Brazil and the United 
States in the 1950s to compose Metas Plan, as exposed by 
Lafer (1997), was again little significant or practically 
inexistent in both periods. On the other hand, energy, 
transport, food and basic industry were highlighted, in 
particular energy and industrialization matrices. 
 According to Mendonça (1988), the PND II 
came to birth with the imperative challenge to maintain or 
recover the “economic miracle”. Industrial growth had 
fallen from 10 to 4.5% per year and the government-
owned corporation would have to reorient the capital 
accumulation from the consumer goods sector towards the 
production goods sector. We notice again that focus on 
industrialization was one of the strongest tendencies of 
economy. Gremaud and Pires (1999 b) affirm that the oil 
shock influenced payments and productive structure in 
Brazil; then they conclude that investments had as one of 
the priorities the establishment of large companies 
through mergers or takeovers that, according to 
Mendonça (1988), are forms of oligopolistic market. 
According to her, the definition of a new industrial sector 
(with priority given to areas of steel, hydro, basic 
chemistry and minerals) generated instabilities; the Plan 
was launched without considering the external scenery; 
political resistance occurred, and speculation invaded the 
financial market. The pointing scenario was this: 
The Brazilian economy followed an 
increasingly speculative trail. At this point 
in time, as the demand for durable 
consumer goods was still under the effects 
of the expansion period, the exceeding of 
the country’s own producing capacity was 
likely to happen. These facts and the 
increasing of costs caused producers to 
prefer to ensure their profit based on the 
price increase, not venturing new 
investments. This behavior, that affected 
inflation fatally, was ratified during PND II. 
[...] The economy recession setting 
deepened. (p. 88-89) 
 Developmentalism is characterized by not 
solving social problems, by the incrementalism of the 
public sector, by sectorial favoring to private companies, 
inflation worsening and increase in state debt. 
 The PND III, the period between 1980 and 1985, 
crossed again the same problems as before: social 
inequality and low sector and/or regional growth, 
according to the Basic Document (BRAZIL, 1979). 
Gremaud and Pires (1999 b) summarize the problem with 
the following symptoms: energy crisis, public debt in 
payments, enlarged external debt, alarming inflation and 
severe unemployment. The new Plan estimates 
investments: to the sectors of Agriculture and Supply, 
according to the same authors, through incentives to 
production, research, innovation and improvement of 
living conditions of rural workers, including “[...] the 
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incentive to forestry and agroforestry for food and 
energy” (p. 98 );to the industrial sector, continuous 
incentives to productivity and focus on increasing exports 
and supply of consumer goods; the energy sector is 
greatly highlighted, being expected the discouragement to 
the production of energy by means of oil and coal by-
products and the encouraging of nuclear, hydropower and 
other “clean” forms of energy, besides ethanol 
production; to the social sector, in education, culture, 
health, housing, employment and worker’s compensation, 
nevertheless, generic expectations of improvement. Also, 
according to Gremaud and Pires (1999 b, p. 99), the 
 
definition of the plan was damaged, since 
the establishing of quantitative targets did 
not happen, because of the determinant 
restriction imposed by the crisis in the 
Balance of Payments, primarily related to 
the costs of external debt and its evolution, 
whose determinants were out ofthe 
government control ― second oil shock, 
increase in the U.S. interest rates, U.S. 
recession and sharp drop in terms of trade. 
 Thus, Gremaud and Pires (1999 b) say that the 
Plan was abandoned in 1982, with the country going 
through the same problems of social inequality and 
internal and external debt. Until that point, there was an 
investment fixture almost in the bottlenecks and 
germination points, being far from the “economic 
miracle” period, from 1969 to 1973. According to Furtado 
(2005, p. 89-90), 
the idea of economic development is a mere 
myth. Thanks to it, it has been possible to 
divert attention from the basic task of 
identifying the basic needs of the 
community and of the possibilities that 
provide men the advance of science, to 
concentrate them in abstract goals, as are 
investments, exports and growth. 
 This observation is valid throughout the flow of 
developmentalism, which considers development only 
what is related to the capital, dealing with other issues as 
mere supporting bases. Only more recently the minimalist 
concept has been replaced by a network of concepts ― of 
social, cultural, regional, scientific, technological, 
educational and economic development. The lack of 
quantitative targets or not fulfillment of the proposed ones 
keep the same ones in a single path, opening craters  in  
the germination points (overexploitation of natural 
resources, fiscal and wage squeeze, use of foreign capital) 
and penetrating only the surface of bottlenecks (deficit of 
health and education, social and regional inequality and 
innovative, technological and industrial insufficiency). 
 
2.2 THE INFLATIONARYVICE 
Brazil came out of the period of military dictatorship in 
1984, with chronic problems. In 1986, during the 
government of José Sarney, the Cruzado Plan was 
launched. The scenario, according to Kon (1999), was 
chaotic, because of a larger inflation allied to droughts 
and frosts in agriculture. The rate, which was 40% per 
year in 1978 and 90% in 1980, reached 100% in 1981 and 
1982 and 220% in 1983 and 1984. With drastic measures, 
the Cruzado Plan was established, as the author continues 
(p. 109-112): 
a) Replacement of Cruzeiro with Cruzado, with the 
currency conversion in the order of Cr$ 1,000.00 
to Cz$ 1.00; 
b) Price freezing for an undetermined period, 
involving the general population to reach control; 
c) Conversion of contractual obligations according to 
currencies conversion; 
d) Conversion of wages considering their average 
value and purchasing power, with an additional 
bonus of 8%; 
e) Conversion of rents, installments and school dues 
also by the principle of the average; 
f) Control of monetary adjustment (wages, contracts, 
savings) by indexation or de-indexation values 
according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI); 
g) Creation of a new CPI, for the conversion of data 
between Cruzeiros and Cruzados; 
h) Establishment of a new fiscal policy, in relation to 
the conversion of taxation, wage bonus and 
reporting systems of income tax; 
i) Creation of interbank deposit from a new 
monetary and credit policy; 
j) Settlement of an exchange rate without freezes; 
k) Establishment of unemployment insurance. 
 In general, the fundamental bottleneck was 
inflation, with risks to reach 300% per year according to 
Kon (1999) or, according Macarini (2009), over 400%. 
The freeze and its associated measures to introduce the 
control of inflation occurred under risk, in view of the 
increase in aggregate demand and insufficiency in 
aggregate supply, besides the increase in the public 
deficit, as evidenced by Kon (1999). For the poor class, 
there was a decrease in uncertainties related to their 
purchasing power, since the salary adjustments never 
followed the inflation indices, while the creation of the 
unemployment insurance consisted of a palliative income 
redistribution policy; for those who accumulated capital, 
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speculation cooled until a new inflationary process was 
generated.  
 The correction of such a complex problem, 
which was the collapse of the national economy, could 
not be done by mere proposition and in a minimalist way. 
Instabilities required a correction of the Cruzado Plan, 
known as “Cruzadinho”, which brought a Metas Plan 
involving a rise in income tax, opening of compulsory 
loans and investments incentives, among other measures. 
Late in 1986, that is, before the completion of one year, 
the Cruzado Plan 2 was launched, and according to Kon 
(1999), that happened especially to carry out a 
realignment of prices and taxes, in view of the “slowing 
growth” and “tax evasion”. However, inflation was 
reactivated from 7.7% per year in 1986 to 1,000% in price 
increase; in  interest rates, it reached 2,000% per year. 
Regarding external debt, the government decreed a 
unilateral moratorium in February 1987. 
Two new plans would be launched in the Sarney 
era. The Bresser Plan, inaugurated by the Finance 
Minister Bresser Pereira, in the first half of 1987, 
according to Carvalheiro (1999), had as one of its 
purposes to promote a new price freeze for 90 days, 
associated with wages corrective measures, market and 
exchange prices, among other measures. A Unit Price 
Reference (URP) was established at a ratio of 1 to 100 
Cruzados. The goals were, according to Carvalheiro 
(1999, p. 128): 
a) ensure economic development and full 
employment;  
b) redistribute income between households and 
regions more fairly;  
c) fight inflation and achieving a reasonable 
price stability;  
d) achieve trade surplus that allowed the 
negotiation of external debt in a sovereign 
manner. 
 The Consistência Macroeconômica Plan (PCM) 
was launched, aiming the gradual GDP growth, increase 
of credit in the trade balance, inflation control and better 
income distribution for the period between 1987 and 1988 
― that is, it fights practically the same bottlenecks as 
ever. In the same period, in August 1987, Programa de 
Ação Governamental  was also launched (PAG) to be 
valid between 1987 and 1991, in order to “[...] achieve 
sustainable development and achieve success in 
combating inflation” (p. 142), as Carvalheiro exposes 
(1999). 
 Carvalheiro (1999) also reports that, with the 
inauguration of the new Minister of Finance, Maílson da 
Nobrega, Verão Plan was launched in January 1989. The 
main measure was clearly expressed in the statement by 
President José Sarney on January 15, 1989, according to 
the journal Revista de Economia Política (1989, p. 127): 
“[...] I want to make a call to all for a total battle against 
the inflationary process, with the toughest weapons and 
deepest measures ever taken in this country to face this 
problem”. Sarney adds in the same statement that 
inflation could reach 1,500% per year and that “[...] no 
State has ever had its institutions preserved in a situation 
like that” (p. 128). Was that the time for a new shock? 
The country implemented another currency, the Cruzado 
Novo, through the Provisional Measure  32 (BRAZIL, 
1989), for the same reason as before (from Cz$ 1,000.00 
to NCz$ 1.00), and promoted a new price freeze for an 
indefinite period. The remaining matters – exchange 
control, foreign debt trading and price realignment 
folowed, among other measures. According to Moraes 
(1999, p. 177), the GDP growth between 1980 to 1989 
was only 2.2% per year on average, justifying what they 
qualified as the “lost decade”. 
 A new political phase began in March 1990, by 
the inauguration of President Fernando Collor de Melo. 
With it, Brasil Novo Plan, or Collor I Plan, formalized 
through a series of Provisional Measures of liberal 
approach, as demonstrated by Moraes (1999). The control 
of cartels and trusts and of price and wages adjustments 
formed a backbone of political organization intervention. 
There were short-term freezes and increase in the prices 
of communication services and fuel supply. We must also 
highlight the determination of the exchange rate by the 
market itself, the institution of Cruzeiro replacing 
Cruzados Novos at the rate of Cr$ 1.00 for NCz$ 1.00, 
besides the confiscation of savings worth more than Cr$ 
50,000.00. In February 1991, inflation reached, according 
to Moraes (1999), 20% per month, revealing weaknesses 
also of the Collor Plan in relation to this bottleneck. 
Between January and April 1991, Collor Plan II was in 
effect, restarting the price correction and freeze, raising 
public tariffs. The minister then, Zelia Cardoso de Mello, 
was replaced in May 1991 by Marcílio Marques. The new 
minister abandoned the practice of price freezing and 
inflation reached 1,158% in 1992. Then, there was the 
president’s impeachment on corruption charges. 
 By the end of 1992, with the inauguration of 
Vice President Itamar Franco in succession to the deposed 
president, begins a new era, that of neoliberalism. The 
Real Plan had as one of its goals the control of inflation 
and again replaced one currency with another, but new 
directions were given and could not be analyzed in this 
short essay. It is, therefore, the object of another work, as 
well as the other Plans from the other eras of the Brazilian 
Government. 
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III. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
During the period of 1968 to 1991, two trends of 
developmentalism existed: the one from the 70s focused 
on the ideals of magnitude that the “economic miracle” 
then raised; and the one from the 80s, got stuck by 
inflationary figures that turned it into the “lost decade”, 
since the low economic growth contrasted with the high 
national and international public debt. If in the first case 
there was an overoptimistic patriotism because of 
industrialization, once not satisfied, the second was an 
agonizing effort to overcome an announced chaos, with 
galloping inflation. 
 The objectives of industrial growth and better 
income distribution were not achieved in the first phase: 
either there were no established objective goals to pursue, 
or they were abandoned through the way, when 
established. Thus, there was a period of financial stability 
and economic growth, but development remained 
precarious. Systems to control inflation by freezing prices 
and other sudden forms of State intervention were only 
palliative, since the periods of peace were too short. State 
intervention did not led to governance and vices of fiscal 
policies remained. Within a precarious management, 
severe corruption problems arose. 
 Developmentalism reigned in place of 
development in the first phase because Brazil was not 
able to address the points of germination (availability of 
resources, opportunities for exports, GDP growth), 
promote the overcoming of social and regional 
inequalities; and in the critical phase of inflationary vice, 
there was an increased debt and not enough progress in 
addressing social issues. We also notice a linear path, 
fairly uneven during the 80s, through which travel public 
policies without an innovative guideline for the 
promotion of development. This path continues, but the 
gap does not seem so announced. Studies on the Real 
Plan until the National Policy for Regional Development 
today would be quite auspicious for a broader view of the 
complex conditions of the country. 
 From Goethe’s Faust to the Petersburg of Peter I, 
as references in the wake of development, there is a path 
that repeats itself in different ways on the national scene, 
since social issues remain unresolved in Brazil ― despite 
economic growth ― and the ideals of magnitude dissolve 
in historical ills. The stigma of developmentalism is this 
controversial condition of failure due to repeated 
mistakes, either by lack of preparation, or by a suspicious 
form of corruptive accommodation. Between public debt 
and inflationary vice, coexisting during the decades 1970 
and 1980, (still) rests the same issue in the country: What 
is development? What is the country’s development? 
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